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ABSTRACT:
This paper is devoted to a detailed analysis of the information flow
in the CIC on non-NTDS equipped destroyer types. Our analysis
is accomplished via a model of the CIC operation which is keyed
to the threat environment. The model has two fundamental com-
ponents. One is the physical communications framework; the other
is a message priority structure, which is determined by the threat.
Recommendations for action to improve CIC performance, which are
based on the analysis, are included.
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1. Introduction and history . The project order provided funds to con-
duct an analysis of the information flow within CIC during ASW operations,
to develop a mathematical model of the time-dependent priority states of
the system keyed to the threat environment, and to investigate procedures
for automating priority traffic flow suitable for testing in real time in the
CIC model. The investigation was conducted at the Naval Postgraduate
School, originally with Professor C. E. Menneken, designated Principal
Investigator, and Professors T. Jayachandran and C. O. Wilde, the other
investigators.
The project was supported by ONR at a total cost of approximately
one man-year, with the work distributed over a two-year period of time.
During the first year considerable effort was expended in obtaining back-
ground, as part of the self-education phase, on CIC doctrine, con-
figurations, and operations. Information was gathered from a variety of
sources: manuals on strategy, tactics and operations; interviews with
CIC-qualified naval officers, interviews and discussions with NPS faculty
members for detailed information on such items as adaptive control systems
and technical aspects of the NTDS computer; a visit to the ASW training
center in San Diego to attend ROPEVAL 4-70, a mock-up of subsequent
at-sea exercise; and visits aboard ships to observe actual CIC's.
In the summer of 1971 the project moved into the constructive phase,
and the transition was marked by two changes in personnel. First, Prof-
fessor Wilde assumed responsibility for leadership of the project and was
formally designated Principal Investigator; this move was initiated and
effected by Professor Menneken, who remained active and provided guidance
throughout the project. The second change was the addition of Professor
D. E. Harrison, Jr. , to the project staff in order to bring its mathematical
and computer modeling capability to the level necessary to accomplish the
project task.
It was recognized early that the civilian investigators alone would be
unable to provide the realism required in order to define a model which
could ultimately serve a useful purpose. We needed continuous input from
naval officers who were operationally experienced in the ASW/CIC en-
vironment and who possessed the academic sophistication necessary in
order to establish a meaningful dialogue with the investigators. The Naval
Postgraduate School proved to be an ideal location for the project in the
sense that we have available a supply of officers with the combination of
sea experience and advanced education required to meet the above criteria.
We interviewed a large number of qualified officers and finally selected a
panel of three. These officers, who faithfully participated in the formal
weekly meetings with the civilian investigators over an extended period
and who spent much spare time thinking and preparing written reports be-
tween meetings, are LCDR H . M . Effron, LT R. D. Horner and LT J. N. Swan.
LCDR Effron's contribution turned out to be of such magnitude as to war-
rant his inclusion as a co-author; and we gratefully acknowledge the
dedicated effort and the vital contribution made by LT Horner and LT Swan.
We briefly mention here, as a sidelight, some "spin-off" from this
project which provides direct benefits to the Navy but which is not in-
cluded in the central results. First, we feel that the officers who parti-
cipated in the project advanced significantly in their ability to perceive
salient and essential features in naval systems and environments, to
analyze these observations rationally, and to formulate their ideas, under-
standings and feelings in a clear, logical and usable manner. A second
peripheral result is that the investigators themselves explored and developed
techniques for capitalizing on the combination of operational experience
and advanced education; this should enhance significantly their ability
to attack and solve Navy-related problems in the future . A third benefit
stems from the fact that one of the investigators is. a member of the group
tasked with the architecture of a proposed operational ASW curriculum at
NPS; we expect that his experience gained from this project will have a
positive effect on the quality of the new program. Finally, we note that
our group made contacts with a number of individuals and groups working
on ASW problems in various agencies, primarily at NELC and NPS, for
mutually productive interchanges .
We conclude this section with a brief description of the remaining
contents of this report. In section 2 we present some of the assumptions
and considerations upon which our work is based. In section 3 we
describe the mathematical model itself; this description contains our
principal results. Section 4 is devoted to recommendations based upon
our findings, suggestions for possible further development and applications
of the model, and a discussion of related problems we feel potentially worthy
of investigation.
2. Basic assumptions . The CIC collects, processes (including an
all-important evaluation), and disseminates information used by com-
manders making tactical decisions, by stations which deliver weapons, and
by support units such as assist ships, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters.
In non-NTDS equipped destroyer types (DE, DD, DDG, and DLG) , trans-
mission of information, i.e. general CIC communication with sensors, the
bridge, and external stations, is effected through a complex array of voice
circuits, phone lines, talkers, messengers, and more exotic means of
communication.
It was a general consensus on the part of our CIC-experienced officers
that although the ASW/CIC has some degree of effectiveness in the simplest
tactical situation, i.e. one-on-one, destroyer vs. submarine, there do
exist serious problems even in this setting. (We shall not elaborate on
these problems because it was also agreed that the one-on-one situation
is unrealistic, that is it should not be expected to occur in actual practice.)
There was strong agreement that even a small increase in complexity of the
tactical problem causes a sharp deterioration in both the reliability and
the effectiveness of the system. Our panel agreed that even in a situation
where a contact is prosecuted with the help of one assist ship and one
support aircraft, several serious problems arise. There are often delays
in transmission of information, crucial information is sometimes lost,
there is an overcrowding of personnel at certain critical locations, the
noise level in "Combat" is at times so high as to interfere with com-
munications , and some equipment is unreliable, all of which problems
often culminate in misleading or simply inaccurate interpretations.
There are other major problem areas associated with the "manually"
operated CIC, which fall under the general headings of human factors and
group dynamics. One problem is that the CIC operation, and even to some
degree its configuration, often depend too heavily on various characteristics
of key personnel in the system, especially the evaluator. In addition, the
efficiency and the reliability of the system depend to an inordinate degree
on crew training and experience. These excessive dependencies seem to
have clearly undesirable aspects; for example, the quality of message trans-
mission via several vocal means, especially sound-powered phones, is
easily affected by the ability of one man to understand another's accent.
Another example is that the evaluator' s actions, including his physical
movements , may very well be dictated by the degree of his confidence in
the CIC team, rather than by basic performance optimization criteria for
the system.
The problems described above, and others which we have omitted, are
apparently sharply diminished in the newer highly automated systems, for
example the NTDS used in AAW Q Although NTDS has its own set of problems,
much of the concept seems fundamentally sound, and current and future
progress in computer hardware and software technology should lead to
command and control systems for AAW which are operationally practical.
Recently attempts have been made to use similar, highly automated,
command and control systems in ASW, such as the ASWSCCS which is
now actually in use on several ships. We are convinced that the degree
to which a command and control system can be feasibly automated depends
almost exclusively upon the quality of the input data. In particular, we
feel that the root of all problems in the ASW/CIC is the low quality and
the low acquisition rate of the input data (in spite of many advances in
sensory technology). In essence, therefore, the system must extract
for its output accurate and timely information from a relatively meager in-
put. The problems involved in this task are sufficiently complex that a
completely, or even very highly, automated system would require sophisti-
cated and expensive computer hardware and software beyond the existing
capability.
One of our original goals was the development of a mathematical
model of the ASW/CIC that would define an adaptive control system in
which changes of the priority state, keyed to the threat environment,
would be automated. (See section 3 for a discussion of these states.)
Two of the basic assumptions of this program turned out to be false. First,
the priority system which determines the information flow within CIC is
not a simple threat-environment system; it is in fact a complex system
which involves several interrelated priority structures (see section 3 for
details). The second assumption that our investigation failed to confirm
was that the ASW/CIC operation was already understood from a systems
point of view, so that existing models would provide a basis for our
study. In fact, we found no evidence, at the levels of classification
available to us
,
to indicate that the ASW/CIC has ever been approached
as a total system, or even that the requirements of the system have been
adequately defined. The CIC seems to have evolved on an empirical basis
out of practical considerations, such as physical constraints, rather than
through a form-follows-function systems design approach.
With the considerations of the preceding paragraph in mind, we
made the decision to change the course of our investigation and construct
the very basic conceptual model of the ASW/CIC required before we could
address the problem of an adaptive system. We have developed such a
model, and it is described in the next section. We have not rejected the
idea of an adaptive control system, and this idea may be worthy of further
study; we did feel, however, that we would be unable to make a meaning-
ful approach to the problem without first developing a theoretical sub-
structure for the analysis.
Our model, potentially, can pave the way for immediate, significant,
cost-effective improvements in the Navy's ASW capability. While we
agree that ships with computerized command and control systems will
probably ultimately develop high operational efficiency, because of the
cost and time involved in research, development and production such
ships will not be available in sufficient numbers to constitute the Navy's
primary ASW destroyer force for a number of years. The cost of back- fitting
existing ships with large computers appears to be prohibitive. We be-
lieve that there is a good possibility that our model could be used as the
first step in the development of an inexpensive, but operationally more
effective, CIC. Through this model we have achieved a deeper under-
standing of the real operation of the ASW/CIC. In fact, we have reached
to such a degree of understanding that it should be possible now to de-
termine functions that could be automated, using inexpensive and avail- -
able hardware, to produce a system which would be operationally effective
at greatly reduced manning levels. This point will be discussed further
in the recommendations of section 4
3. Description of the model
A. The action phases . Our point of departure is the assumption
that a destroyer is, at any given time, in exactly one of a known set of
modes, or phases, of ASW operations. We have chosen this particular
beginning because these phases are identified in established doctrine and
are easily recognized by the personnel involved. (We note that our as-
sumption here does not imply that we have ignored the reality of multiple
threats and multiple missions, for we recognize that this investigation
could have been pre-destined to failure by a simplistic approach in which
this reality was ignored or solutions to this very complex problem were
pre-concluded. We feel that an analysis of multiple threats/missions is
possible within the framework we have developed; this is also discussed
further in section 4.)
With a little thought, one can see that it is reasonable to expect that
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the particular set of phases used to describe the operation of a destroyer
as a complete system may be inappropriate to describe coincidentally
the operation of all of its subsystems; we feel that this is indeed the case
with the subsystem we have identified, very loosely, as "CIC" . Specifi-
cally, for the CIC we have distinguished a set of six action phases,
based on our recognition that a distinct communications pattern exists in







In order to clarify the meaning of these terms, we trace the scenario
of a possible action. Initially, the ship is steaming in a search phase
At the first indication of a possible contact, other detector operators are
alerted, and we pass to phase 2. During the second phase the decision
that a contact actually exists is made, and the CIC is brought to a higher
readiness state. As soon as the contact has been verified, we pass to
phase 3; here the nature and the magnitude of the threat posed by the con-
tact are established, and a recommendation is made to command on the
action to be taken. By the end of the evaluate-threat phase, the following
decisions will have been made by command: to act, the method of attack,
the attack center (ASAC , Sonar, UB, Conn, or Weapons Control ). The
end of phase 3 occurs as soon as all three of these decisions have been
made.
During the prosecute phase, effective control passes to the specified
attack center which, subject to command override, directs maneuvers and
commits a particular weapons system to the attack. At the instant the
weapon is irreversibly committed, the attack phase begins. In the actual
time from irreversible commitment of the weapon (usually weapon launch)
to weapon exhaustion (including a "hit")/ contingency plans are imple-
mented and weapons systems are prepared for a follow-on attack. The
attack phase terminates, hopefully, with some indication of success in
the attack. The results of the attack are then evaluated during the post-
evaluate phase, and the decision made to return to the prosecute phase for
the same target, or to search, evaluate, or prosecute for a new target. A
flow diagram to illustrate this example scenario is given in Figure 1.
B. The fundamental network
.
The next step is to describe the
general communications structure in the CIC , which will enable us sub-
sequently to describe the information flow in each of the six action phases,
As indicated in section 2, transmission of CIC information in non-NTDS
equipped destroyer types is effected through a highly complex array of
1. Weapons Control is an "attack center" only for a surface action.
Otherwise its function is to release the physical interlock (in NTD3 as



























Figure 1. Example Scenario.
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of nodes and branches as the fundamental network.
Within this framework it is possible to analyze the communications
problem at several levels. At the most basic level, we ascertain which
nodes must be connected by branches in each specific action situation.
At the next leve l, the links in each branch are assigned priorities; this
priority structure functions as follows: if a high priority link is un-
available, the communicator will attempt to send his message via a less
desirable, i.e , lower priority, link. At still another level , with all
channels operating, the evaluator must assign priorities that determine
the order in which he accepts information from the various channels. We
believe that a careful analysis of the interplay between these three distinct
priority structures, and the ways they influence the fundamental network,
is essential in order to understand how the CIC really functions. We
shall return to this question after we complete the description of the
physical communications framework.
A generalized node-branch network for a "CIC" in its ASW configura-
tion is shown in Figure 2. The nodes of this finite graph correspond to
existing stations aboard representative ships (Some of the stations
shown are not located within the physical confines of the CIC, so that
we are not actually showing the CIC per se c However, the nodes that we
do include are all essential for an analysis of the CIC information flow.)
Although some of the branches have been excluded for simplification, it is
the opinion of our panel of CIC-qualified officers that the branches in-
cluded here are those which are actually utilized in normal operational
12
communication equipment. In the communications system of any ship,
many of the channels are redundant (some purposely so), and information
routings are, in practice, often a matter of personal taste. Because of
this complexity and this variability, the system actually realized in
exercises, as well as combat situations, effectively defies analysis. De-
scribed below is a conceptualization of the system which is sufficiently
simplified that systematic analysis becomes practical, but which is
sufficiently flexible to contain all the necessary elements of a real-world
combat communications system.
It seems appropriate, and it has been the most productive for us,
to visualize this communication system as a network
. This network accepts
raw input data from the outside world, processes it, and conveys specific
output information and commands to various stations. The network con-
sists of nodes , i.e. manned stations, and a set of branches , which con-
nect some of the nodes. On a specific ship, under specific action condi-
tions the branch can be activated by more than one link. In this context,
a link may be a dial telephone, a sound-powered telephone, a human
messenger, a face-to-face conference, a pneumatic tube, an electro-
mechanical servo system, or any of several other communications devices by
which information is normally transmitted into, out of, or within CIC. To
communicate along a branch, first a link is chosen, and then if communi-
cation by that link is possible, a channel is open. If the first link is in-
operable or in use, an attempt is then made to establish the channel
via an alternate link (in the same branch). We refer to the system
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situations Even this simplified network contains redundant branches;
for example, information can be transmitted from sonar to the evaluator
via either the sonar supervisor or plot 1. While redundancy is not neces-
sarily undesirable, in an environment where space and manpower are at
a premium, redundant portions of the network are immediately questionable
The portion of the network shown by dashed lines is the part which is
necessary for a surface action. The analysis of this portion is not
difficult, but we have not included it in this report for the sake of brevity.
However, this portion of the fundamental network must be taken into
account in any new CIC system design.
C„ The phase nets . The node-branch network shown in Figure 2
is sufficiently general to describe the distance communications patterns
for the six action phases described above. Each of the phases requires
that a specific, well defined, portion of the fundamental network be in a
primarily active state while the remainder of the network remains primarily
passive. We shall refer to these sub-networks as phase nets . Each
action phase requires a unique net except for the prosecution phase, in
which two basic phase nets exist because in different situations the
prosecution may be handled by UB or the ASAC. The complete set of phase
nets, with the active portion of the fundamental network shown by the
heavy lines, are given in Figures 3 through 9.
The phase nets in the figures below give an immediate pictorial
indication of the level of complexity of the communications problem in
















have been constructed on the assumption that at least one assist unit is
present, so external communications at the evaluator level have been




The phase net diagrams given in Figures 3-9 show
clearly the binary branches, i.e. , those which connect two nodes. How-
ever, these binary connections alone are insufficient to describe the
actual communications framework because in practice there are often three
or more nodes which are connected simultaneously. For example, the 1JS
sound-powered telephone circuit may connect any or all of the nodes
,
Conn, Sonar Supervisor, UB, and Evaluator, together. These higher-
order connections will be called clusters
. (We avoided the apparently
obvious terminology choice, "loop", because it fails to convey the simul-
taneity of the multiple connections.)
The clusters that are realized in practice normally vary to some ex-
tent from ship to ship, but there is apparently sufficient commonality of
practice to provide for a general description. It is important to describe
the clusters here for at least two reasons. First, these clusters constitute
an intrinsic characteristic of the phase nets, so that without them the
description of the information flow would be incomplete. In addition , these
clusters are essential in the analysis of how the evaluator interacts with
the remainder of the system. This latter point will be considered along with
the question of priorities after the description of the physical communica-
tions framework has been completed.
23
Diagrams are also helpful in visualizing clusters. In Figures 10
through 16 we have drawn graphical representations of the clusters in
each of the action phase nets. We emphasize that our purpose is only
to describe clusters that are widely used in the ASW/CIC. There is, as
noted earlier, considerable variation in practice, so that our work should
be understood as an attempt to approximate the general situation, rather
than as an attempt to be precise.
In Figures 10-16 the branches are indicated by two distinct types of
lines. A solid line indicates that the channel is normally open, whereas
a dashed line indicates that the channel is not actually in use most of
the time, but that there is important information transmitted sufficiently
often to consider the branch operational in the given phase.
E. The links . We have now established the basic CIC communications
structure, i.e. , we have shown where information normally flows in each
of the action phases. Our next step is to indicate how the transmission of
information is physically accomplished, and this will then complete our
description of the physical communications framework.
We begin with a list of the types of communications links normally

























Figure 12. The Cluster in Phase 3.
Evaluator


























































































In addition to these primary links there are several that are used less




The links, which open communications channels, also require vari-
ous types of interfaces . An Interfaces ../" A.
interface is needed between the Cj—II — II
—(^)
Node Node
link and the node, as shown in
Figure 17. These interfaces Figure 17. An open channel,
may be visual, aural, or even human. For example, a visual interface
may be a flashing light, an analog display, or a printout. An aural inter-
face may be a bell, a buzzer, or a loudspeaker. We also include humans,
for example talkers, as interfaces rather than as nodes, partly to prevent
cluttering of our network diagrams, and partly because the functions per-
formed by the nodes have a different intrinsic nature than does the basic
function of a human interface. We have not included a detailed interface
analysis in our study, but we feel that an in-depth study of the interface
problem will be essential in any CIC system design program.
In general, information may be transmitted along a given branch by
any of several links. The choice of the link used to activate a channel
is usually governed by a rather definite priority system which, of course,
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has some variation with ships and personnel. The link priorities, which
we discuss further in section 3F, depend upon the action phase. We
have made an attempt to determine general usage of links, and the descrip-
tion of our findings is contained in the phase net diagrams, Figures 3-9.
The numbers shown beside the various active channels correspond to the
numbers assigned to the links in our list above. The order of the numbers
is significant in that the priorities are listed in descending order, i.e.
,
the link listed first has highest priority, etc. A slash between two num-
bers indicates that both links are used simultaneously.
F. The priority system. In any communications network every
message has a priority, i.e. , a claim upon the services of the physical
facilities and the human beings which comprise the system. For example,
in our national telephone system service is on a simple first-come, first-
served basis. In this example, all messages are assumed to have the
same value, so they all receive the same priority. In the CIC, however,
messages have different values, so the CIC operation requires a more
complex priority system. We shall attempt here to indicate how various
elements interact to influence CIC message priorities.
The ultimate priority assigned to a particular message depends upon
human evaluation of a set of sub-priorities. We have identified three
priority hierarchies which determine this evaluation process. Each hier-
archy consists of a more or less complete set of relative value rankings,
where a message's rank within each hierarachy is determined by a set of
value criteria characteristic of the hierarchy. Individual message
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priorities are not actually assigned via this complicated logical structure,
but the structure enables us to identify the sources of message value. In
a practical situation, the whole process is done automatically, and
almost sub-consciously, by the human beings at the nodes of the network.
Each operator would say that his assignments are made on the basis of the
ship's doctrine and his own past experience. The system succeeds if his
rankings agree with those which the evaluator would have assigned under
the same circumstances, and it fails to a greater or lesser extent if they
do not.
The first, and best defined, hierarchy of priorities is completely
determined by the operational phase of the ship. This hierarachy is com-
pletely general, and essentially independent of the communications con-
figuration on a particular ship. These are truly exogenous priorities,
because they are determined by the external environment of the system.
Apparently they can be uniquely determined, preassigned, and manipulated
by equipment in the CIC.
In each operational phase the evaluator requires information from
a well defined set of nodes. This need, when specified in terms of
nodes and branches, actually defines the phase net for each phase.
Therefore, the phase nets are really a form of priority assignment for
messages from various nodes under specified conditions. Nodes which
generate low value messages in a specific external environment are
excluded from that phase net; i.e.
,
their messages are given very low,
or even zero, priority. These externally determined message values will
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be called the phase priorities
.
We emphasize that this first set of priorities is externally imposed and
does not depend upon human value judgments. These message priorities
are unique and, while they vary sharply with changes in the action phase,
they can be easily assigned. In fact, our panel of CIC-qualified officers
had no difficulty in assigning phase priorities to various types of messages.
Since this hierarchy is apparently well understood, we shall not elaborate
on it further.
If the system in actual practice were to consist simply of nodes and
branches, then the phase priorities could be assigned mechanically with-
in each operational phase. The design of an appropriate message pro-
cessing system would then become a problem for a communications engineer.
However, in reality the network contains people at the nodes, and links
which activate the branches. In order to pass from a branch in the model
world to a channel in the real world, someone must choose a link. This
choice is made according to a set of values which we shall call the link
priorities
.
Link priorities depend largely upon the following two major factors:
the communications equipment available for service as links, and the human
characteristics of the individuals who man the nodes which are connected
by the links. Thus, these priorities must be specified according to the
demands of a particular CIC.
We believe, further, that it is impossible to achieve the invariance
which is characteristic of the phase priorities. While it may be possible
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theoretically to obtain a standardization of hardware on board a ship,
the maintainability and the effects of human feelings would still need to
be considered. For example, in some given situations, two distinct
individuals may choose different links to effect a branch, and the problem
is compounded by the additional consideration of utilization. Doctrine
helps here, but it is unable to cover all contingencies, and it is also
unable to specify the "best" link for all people. Therefore, the link priorities
are humanized, or personalized, and they do not lend themselves to quanti-
fication, or mechanization. It follows that any concrete realization of
the CIC model must make provision for human characteristics in the link
priorities
.
The third set of priorities is engendered exclusively by the physiologi-
cal and the psychological, characteristics of the evaluator. This hierarchy
of priorities arises because although it appears to be physically possible
to deliver all available information to the evaluator 's station, if this
complete delivery is encouraged, the evaluator becomes so inundated with
data that he has no time to assimilate or evaluate the information which he is
receiving. Optimization of information flow, therefore, does not optimize
unit effectiveness, and it may very well downgrade the performance of the
complete system. In successful CIC operations, the evaluator consciously,
or sub-consciously, limits the amount of information which he receives.
The message values which govern the way in which the evaluator accepts
information are called the load priorities
.
Trie load priorities define the balance between the eva.luator's desire
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for complete knowledge and his ability to assimilate information. They
depend :o some extent upon his confidence in the individuals who are
manning the CIC, but they probably depend even more upon his own per-
sonal characteristics
, For example, the aggressive, decisive evaluator
requires less information from the phase net than does the cautious, con-
servative individual who rechecks each datum with the originator. The
times required for a particular evaluator to comprehend and assimilate
information, and to formulate recommendations, are very important here,
as is his propensity toward aural or visual presentation. Thus, load
priorities are humanized, as are the link priorities, and provision must
also be made for human characteristics in the determination of load
priorities..
This completes the description of our basic model. There remains
a substantial amount of work which must be done in order to use the model
to obtain the practical results mentioned in section 2, and we shall
elaborate on the problems involved here, as well as some related pro-
blems, in the next section. In addition, the model we have described
here serves as the basis for some specific action recommendations which
we shall also present in the next section.
4 . Immediate Consequences and Long Range Implications
A. Evaluator . While many of the details of this model have not
been developed completely (we shall have recommendations for further
development in the section 4B) , even from its present preliminary form
certain useful results become apparent. The first finding is particularly
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relevant to the evaluator.
In the course of our investigation, two rather well defined approaches
to the load priority problem have emerged „ We shall refer to these ap-
proaches as the modes of operation of the CIC. One group of evaluators
uses a method which is best described as a sampling technique. When
this method is used, the evaluator follows trends in the development of
the problem by sampling, say, every third or fourth message from the
repetitive sources. In this mode of operation the evaluator does not impede
the flow of information on the one hand, but neither does he attempt to
assimilate every message from each channel. He follows the development
of the status estimate, rather than focusing his attention on the exact
current status
.
The second approach to the load priority problem uses single nodes,
or combinations of nodes, as "sub-evaluation" stations. In this mode
of operation information is to some extent evaluated at these stations,
and it then collects there. The "processed" information is then supplied
to the evaluator on a demand basis, i.e. , when he asks for it. This
mode requires that the evaluator have a high order of confidence in his
sub-evaluators , which can come only as a result of relatively long
association and careful training.
We believe that the sampling mode is most useful when the nodes,
and therefore the data which they supply, are of questionable reliability.
In this mode the distortions introduced by faulty message transmission or
reception tend to be smoothed out. On the other hand the sub-evaluation,
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demand, mode appears to be the superior of the two when it is practical,
and it also seems to hold more promise as a means of extending the
capability of the CIC. That is, if certain functions of the CIC are auto-
mated in a man/machine system, then a computer actually serves as a
sub-evaluator which provides information to human evaluators on demand.
When the human specifies the operational phase, the computer can evaluate
the phase priorities of its inputs, but the evaluator determines the in-
formation required, and the rate and the form of presentation.
Recommendation for immediate action. We recommend that the
evaluator 's training provide him with an introduction to this model of the
CIC and the message priority structure which it defines, so that he may
view the CIC as a single system which should be designed to respond
efficiently to his direction. The evaluator's training should also introduce
him to the concept we have called "modes of operation", and outlined
above
.
The evaluator should understand that the alternative mode in which
he exercises positive control over the way in which information is presented
to him is a mode in which he may often be forced to choose between mes-
sages which are presented to him simultaneously. These choices involve
a waste of time, especially for the less experienced evaluator, to the
extent that the evaluator may fall behind in his evaluation of the problem.
Such a mode should never be recommended or encouraged in any way,
because it lacks the flexibility to respond effectively to a series of
crisis situations. The two preferred modes, demand and sampling,
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minimize slippage of the evaluation, and thereby increase the efficiency
of the CIC. Where it is practical, sub-evaluation with preplanned
override of the demand control system can be particularly responsive to
rapidly changing situations.
We recommend further that the evaluator's training program make him
keenly aware of the importance of human factors in the CIC organization.
He must realize fully the impact that human characteristics of members of
his team have upon this system. (In fact, some such understanding is
crucial if he is to grasp the significance of the "mode-of-operation" con-
cept and be able to apply these ideas successfully.) An understanding of
how the human characteristics of his crew influence the CIC operation
is one key to the evaluator's ability to optimize effectiveness of the system.
Of equal importance are the human characteristics of the evaluator
himself. He should know his own capabilities and limitations, and be
able to make rational adjustments in the system to accommodate them.
In order to facilitate the development of this ability, the evaluator should
have an objective, accurate and, where possible, quantitative appraisal
of his own traits
.
Recommendation for future action. Although our team is not competent
to make professional judgments in human factors situations, a committee
of experts in this area should consider the problem, and perhaps recommend
the development of a battery of tests that will measure, for a student
evaluator, such elements as his time rates in comprehending, assimilating,
and correlating information. Such characteristics as his ability to plan,
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organize, control, and communicate could also be tested. His speed
in drawing conclusions, i.e., making decisions, on the basis of pro-
cessed data is also important. These are only examples, and a careful
analysis should be conducted to produce a comprehensive list of those
personal traits of the evaluator which effect the CIC operation. The
student evaluator could be tested, informed fully of the results, and
brought to understand how he can use this knowledge to operate a better
CIC.
B. The Model . As mentioned earlier in this report, we believe that
our model potentially can serve as the basis for improvements in the Navy's
ASW capability. We would like to mention two possible contributions.
(1) Multiple Threat Environment . An immediate first approximation to the
communications problems in a multiple threat environment can be made
by combining, i.e. , overlaying, of phase net diagrams. The potential
sources of trouble must occur where a single channel must simultaneously
carry information for both phases. These channels, and therefore, the
overloaded nodes, are those where the active channels of the two phase
nets coincide. Because of time limitations, we were unable to continue
the development of the model in this direction.
Recommendation for immediate action . The phase nets for multiple threat
environments should be constructed, the problem areas identified and
studies undertaken to determine whether it is possible to process the
data in some other way. This action is possible without further develop-
ment of the model itself.
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(2) Communications . In its present form, the model is not sufficiently
developed to make an immediate impact upon communications problems,
but we have identified from the model the directions in which it must be
developed to make contributions in this area. Implementation of the
studies suggested here will provide the quantitative information necessary
before the model can be applied to specific problems. For example, a
detailed analysis of the functions performed by the evaluator appears to
be appropriate for the next step. Flow charts which show various decisions
(for action recommendations to command) the evaluator must make during
ASW operations should be constructed. In Figure 18 we present an ex-
ample of the type of flow chart that would be useful in an analysis of the
evaluator's functions. This example is rather general in nature, and de-
tailed charts are needed to describe typical specific action scenarios.
When the study of the evaluator's functions has been completed, a
reasonable choice for the next step seems to be a detailed analysis of
the functions performed at the various nodes. It should be possible to
relate these functions to the needs of the evaluator. This analysis, in
order to be successful, must contain a solution of the priority problem,
i.e. , a complete understanding of the interrelationship between the
priority structures identified in section 3, so that ultimately a unique,
phase-dependent priority system evolves. When this deep understanding
of all crucial aspects of information flow is achieved, it should then be
possible to decide which functions can be profitably automated, and how

































































When our model has been supplemented with the additional informa-
tion just described, there will arise the question of feasibility of compu-
ter simulation of the enlarged model. While it seems impossible to
account for the variability in the actions of the humans at some of the
nodes, it may still be possible to obtain useful information from a partial
model of the system. It may be possible to conduct a probabilistic study
wherein random threats are generated, the nodes constitute the states in
a Markov chain, and data are put into the system and processed on a
probabilistic basis. On the other hand, it may be better to study the
system as a game, with human players. We believe that this decision
cannot be made at this time.
C. Commonality of AAW and ASW ships . Our group appreciates that
the armament and the sensors differ significantly between ships configured
for these two functions. This investigation was initiated to facilitate the
automation of the ASW CIC, but there remains the larger question of the
relationship between CIC operations in the ASW and AAW modes. From
a command and control point of view it is evident that much of the display
hardware and computational capability requirement could be met with a
single system. The fundamental question of command and control problems
of single purpose vs. multi-purpose destroyers appears because the
interfacing requirements are essentially different in the two situations.
On the basis of this model, we feel that it should be possible to design
a common computation/display unit which interfaces directly with the
sensors when operating in an AAW environment, and which interfaces with
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humans at sonar, ECM, and similar sensors used in ASW operations.
The more fundamental problem of the capability of the platform to sustain
armament to accomplish both missions remains, but a computer which
serves as a common bookkeeper/dis player seems possible. This computer
would interface with clusters in the same way that the evaluator now ob-
tains his data c Overloads of the system occur because the evaluator is
unable to assimilate all of the material displayed, not because the
compute/display unit is unable to handle the data input.
Recommendation for immediate action. Investigate the hardware require-
ments for a console by which a human, the sonar officer for example,
could place the conclusions based on his evaluation of the sonar situation
into a visual display where it would be held for the e valuators consideration,
D. Administrative considerations. Our model of the CIC information
system assumes that all channels are open at all times. Unfortunately,
a channel can be blocked by administrative as well as technical failures.
This possibility cannot be ignored, because the normal shipboard adminis-
trative structure is not the same as the CIC command structure. If the
sensor nodes do not respond to directives from the evaluator, the system
also fails. This type of failure can easily be blamed upon the CIC com-
munication problem, when in fact it occurred for completely different
reasons
.
E. Command and Control. Finally, we wish to point out what
appears to us to be a major, and very delicate, problem area, namely the
bridge-CIC complex. We hasten to add that we do not claim to be
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originators here — the problem already has been the object of several
studies and the subject of several articles in recent literature (see,
for example, [2]). Our comments are added because the problem arose
repeatedly during our investigation, it has not been solved, and it effects
the potential value of our work.
We agree with long established tradition that the ship's commanding
officer should make the tactical decisions, because his very selection
for that position carries the implication that among the ship's officers he
has the best qualifications, in terms of experience and total ability, for
making decisions. It follows that the commander should have available
the very best picture of the tactical situation possible. However, in
practice he is often faced with the following dilemma. If he remains on
the bridge during ASW operations, then his tactical information comes
"second-hand", and he risks a situation in which the evaluator is better
informed on the tactical problem than he himself, possibly even to the
extent that it would be better for the evaluator to make the command
decisions. If, on the other hand, the commanding officer stations himself
within the CIC , or sonar control, he risks the possibilities of losing the
perspective from the bridge, of duplicating the efforts of the evaluator,
and of impeding the normal flow of information he wishes to receive.
We believe that the CIC, albeit a system per se, must be regarded
as a subsystem of the ship itself. As such, its purpose is to provide
the commanding officer with the information he needs to make decisions.
Recent advances in display technology offer some hope that a solution
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of this problem may be within reach without major design changes. On
the other hand, solution of the problem may require a whole new physical
layout of the bridge-CIC complex, as suggested in [2]. At any rate, the
mechanics of how the CIC's responsibility to the commanding officer can
be best discharged should be the subject of a systematic and thorough
investigation.
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